Author: Ilyas Kurmanov
Historians believe that the North-South problem in Kyrgyzstan arose only during the Soviet era. Previously, Kyrgyz were not divided into southerners and northerners, westerners and easterners, because they were distributed among different states (Kokand Khanate, Bukhara Emirate, Russian and Chinese Empires). With the formation of a unified Kyrgyzstan in the form of the Kara-Kyrgyz Autonomous Region, the country’s split into south and north began, with all the ensuing consequences: resettlement of southern cadres to the north and northern cadres to the south.
To undermine the roots of manap power, the Bolsheviks began resettling southern manaps to the north, and northern manaps with their close circle and relatives to the south, and vice versa for the southerners. Manaps, finding themselves far from their kin, deprived of their social environment and support, ceased to be influential figures and influence politics and governance.
They ceased to be rulers in a foreign clan environment and yielded power to the Bolsheviks. Revealing this secret to local Kyrgyz communists, the Bolsheviks, following the manaps, began exiling other groups of the population to the regions, trying to control them in this way. This guideline is still used today, because people believe that if you mix the residents of the north and south among themselves, tribalism will disappear. Although the reason lies elsewhere, in the prolonged process of forming the Kyrgyz nation, which is not yet complete. And it did not complete during the construction of socialism.
Currently, the division of Kyrgyzstan into “North” and “South” remains one of the most persistently reproduced themes in the country’s socio-political discourse. This is not just a geographical fact, but a complex socio-political construct that has influenced personnel policy, resource distribution, and even the everyday perception of each other by Kyrgyz people for decades. Unlike interethnic conflicts, the problem of “northerners” and “southerners” has the character of intra-ethnic regional localism. However, this is not “enmity,” but a consequence of institutional failures and geographical fragmentation.
**First. What is the nature of this phenomenon? Why has localism become a “protective mechanism” for the Kyrgyz?**
To understand the ways to solve it, one must abandon moralizing towards regional elites and recognize the functionality of localism. In conditions of weak state institutions in the 1990s–2000s, земляческие ties became the only working social elevator and guarantee of survival. “One’s own” official from the same region was perceived not as a corruptor, but as a patron capable of building a road to the village or arranging a job for a nephew.
The key idea of the original text is crystal clear here: localism is a “protective mechanism” that activates where the state does not perform its functions. As soon as institutions begin to work impartially, the need for a “regional roof” disappears naturally.
**Second. What is the strategy for “treating” this disease? A transition from slogans to foundation and competencies is needed.**
Experts propose a pragmatic approach, far from populism. The solution to the problem lies in creating conditions under which regional identity ceases to be a political and economic resource, i.e., cadres will not be appointed or replaced based on regional origin, as we have seen throughout the Soviet past, the acquisition of sovereignty and independence.
a) For this, it is necessary to create such infrastructure that will be a “stitcher” of the nation. For example, building an alternative “North-South” road and promising railway lines—this is not just logistics, it is the foundation of psychological unity. Direct physical connection between regions destroys “mental borders.” When travel time between Osh and Bishkek decreases, and transportation costs fall, interregional marriages, trade, and tourism will inevitably increase. People stop being abstractions to each other. Therefore, we must maximally utilize the opportunities for building the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway to glue the regions of our country together.
b) Economic decentralization and moving away from the “Bishkek pie”.
Competition for resources intensifies when all resources are concentrated in one point (Chui Valley). Developing growth points in Batken, Talas, or Naryn will reduce pressure on the capital and deprive elites of the reason to demand “compensation” for their region being deprived. Jobs in places reduce the level of internal migration, and thus everyday tension in densely populated cities.
c) Reform of personnel policy. Transition to meritocracy (power of the best).
The key thesis is replacing the principle of localism with the principle of competence. As long as public service is perceived as a way to “feed one’s own,” the country will split. Introducing transparent competitive procedures (based on personal merits) will gradually devalue the importance of the question “whose child are you?”. When professionals come to key positions, not clan appointees, the feeling of regional injustice disappears among other citizens.
**Third, determine the time horizon.**
To the question “How long to wait for the eradication of localist sentiments?” the experience of other countries gives an honest and realistic answer: localism will never completely disappear (as in any other country in the world), but its acute, threatening phase can go away in 20–40 years (one or two generations).
+ Elite change is needed. The political class grown in independent Kyrgyzstan and integrated into global processes is less inclined to play “regional cards”. For modern business or IT specialist, archaic clan divisions are a burden, to put it bluntly.
+ Urbanization is actively taking place, the “melting pot” is working. Bishkek and large cities act as a natural neutralizer. Children of migrants from regions, studying in the same schools and working in the same companies, form a new, supra-regional identity.
**Fourth, demythologization and a unified cultural code are required.**
A very important aspect is debunking the myth of “different peoples”. The cultural, linguistic, and religious commonality of Kyrgyzstani people is about 95%. Differences in dialects or culinary preferences (for example, different ways of cooking plov) should not be a line of fracture, but a subject of cultural exchange.
It is here that domestic tourism and a unified information field play a major role. When southerners go to Issyk-Kul, and northerners to the walnut forests of Arslanbob, the regions will stop being foreign to each other.
**And in conclusion.**
The “North-South” problem in Kyrgyzstan is solvable not by prohibitions and slogans, but by creating powerful linking mechanisms: transport arteries, fair economic elevators, and impartial state institutions. The state must begin to guarantee justice equally for all — and then the need for “one’s own” will disappear by itself. The question is only in the political will of the elites to start this process, and not to parasitize on regional division forever.
*Ilyas Kurmanov, Doctor of Political Science*
The style and grammar of the authors are preserved.
The authors’ opinion may not coincide with the editorial position.
